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srATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action instituted by Respondent for damages for breach 
of lease on September 12, 1980, after trial, judgment was entered on behalf of 
Respondent; on November 3, 1981, Appellant moved, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(l)&(7), 
for relief from the judgment. 
DisrosITION IN LOWER COURT 
'Ihe Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable James S. Sawaya pre-
siding, denied Appellant's motion for relief from the judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHr ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an Order affinning the decision of the District Court. 
srATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Respondent, Valley Leasing, a Division of Intermountain Loan Corpora-
tion, a Utah corporation, is engaged in the commercial leasing of equipnent. It 
carries no inventory of equipnent, but instead, purchases equipnent preselected 
by a prospective lessee and then enters into a lease agreement. TR. R. p. 4, 
lines 16-22. In 1980, Appellant had selected certain equipnent from an equipnent 
dealer that he wanted to lease. 'Ihe dealer referred Appellant to Respondent. 
TR.. R. p. 4, lines 11-15, p. 6, lines 1-15. On January 23, 1980, Valley Leasing 
and Mr. Houghton discussed the lease of a backhoe and Valley Leasing ran a 
credit check on Mr. Houghton who was self-employed in the contruction business. 
TR. R. p. 5, line 1-25. The backhoe was purchased by Respondent from Century 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Equipment for lease to Mr. Houghton. 'IR. R. p. 6, lines 11-15. A lease was 
executed on January 25, 1980. 
The closing on the lease took place in St. George, Utah, at the place 
of business of Appellant and Appellant paid by check the sum of $2,984.43, which 
represented a security deposit and the first month's lease payment. 'IR. R. p. 
6, lines 16-25, p. 7, lines 1-8. 'Th.e lease executed by Mr. Houghton comnenced 
January, 1980, for a term of forty-two months. 'Th.e check initially given to 
Valley Leasing by Mr. Houghton bounced and never was made good. No other pay-
ments were ever made by Mr. Houghton. Mr. Houghton was in possession of the 
equipnent for approximately three months. IB. R. p. 7, lines 2-12, p. 9, lines 
2-8. At the t:llne of the closing on the lease, Mr. Houghton had taken deli very 
of the equipment, and, at the closing, signed a delivery and acceptance certifi-
cate indicating satisfaction with the equipnent so delivered. In April, 1980, 
Respondent retook possession of the equipnent. 'IR. R. p. 6, lines 1-10, p. 8, 
lines 4-13. 
On September 19, 1980, Respondent filed suit in the Third Judicial 
District Court for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, seeking damages for 
breach of lease. On or about October 7, 1980, counsel appeared on behalf of 
Appellant and filed an Answer to Respondent's Complaint. On October 14, 1980, 
Respondent filed a Request for Trial Setting, and, on November 26, 1980, the 
matter was set for a non-jury trial on October 1, 1981. 
Notice of trial setting was sent to counsel for Respondent and 
counsel for Appellant. On or about December 15, 1981, attorneys for Appellant 
withdrew as counsel, filing a Withdrawal of Counsel pursuant to Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure and stating the date in which the matter had been set for trial 
in their notice. 'Ihis motion was mailed to Appellant at his address at 513 
North 500 West, St. George, Utah 84770. 'Ihis was at the time, and presently is 
Appellant's permanent address. 
On September 11, 1981, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge of the 
Third Judicial District of Salt Lake CoW1ty, entered an order for pre-trial 
settlement conference and appearance of counsel and parties. The order was 
mailed to counsel for Respondent and previous coW1sel for Appellant. On Septem-
ber 16, 1981, Respondent mailed to Appellant, Notice to Appoint New Counsel. 
On September 25, 1981, Mr. Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., who formerly repre-
sented Appellant, wrote to Appellant at the same address to which he addressed 
his Withdrawal of Counsel, indicating that he had withdrawn, that trial had been 
set for October 1, 1981, and that they had received a pre-trial order for 
September 22, 1981. Mr. Arnett, in his letter noted that he would not be appear-
ing on behalf of Appellant on October 1, 1981 for the reason that Appellant 
"failed to ever provide us with a retainer". Further, said letter detailed 
the fact that Mr. Houghton had ma.de no contact with the firm since he first 
brought the Summons and Complaint to them nor had he ever answered their letters. 
Mr. Arnett advised Mr. Houghton to obtain counsel or appear on his own behalf 
at the trial. 
At the pre-trial hearing counsel for Respondent appeared, but neither 
Appellant nor any coW1sel for Appellant appeared. 
On October 1, 1981, Respondent appeared for trial, but neither Appellant 
nor any attorney representing Appellant appeared. Appellant's wife did appear, 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
apparently at Appellant's request, for the purpose of representing him, but was 
not allowed to do so as she was not a party to the action nor an attorney. 
The Court took testimony of Respondent and after said testimony, 
judgment was entered against Appellant for a total sum of $15,681.56. 
On November 3, 1981, Appellant filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment. 
Subsequently, after submission of affidavits from Appellant and oral argument, 
this Motion was denied by the District Court. Appellant now prosecutes this 
Appeal frcm that denial. 
ARGUMENT 
IDINT I 
APPELLANT IS LIMITED TO RELIEF UNDER RULE 59, 
UI1AH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that, subject to the 
provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted only in a lirni ted number of 
circumstances. Appellant has not pled compliance with Rule 59 and claims that 
-
Rule 59 is not applicable to this case. ~: '.':' 
failed to appear for the pre-trial conference, the Court indicated that it 
would be willing to handle the matter as a default matter in terms of the 
burden placed on Respondent in presenting evidence at trial. It should be 
noted, however, that no default was entered against Appellant at the pre-trial 
conference, nor was any default entered subsequently. 
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Respondent appeared for trial and produced evidence. Findings of F'act 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were entered after trial. At no time was 
the Answer of Appellant stricken, nor any default judgment entered. The Court 
had before it facts sufficient for the entry of judgment upon trial. While 
the trial Court may have indicated a willingness to handle the case on a default 
basis, nothing in the record indicates that it, in fact, did so. Indeed, the 
trial transcript is fully consistent with the entry of judgment upon trial, not 
a default judgment. 
It is Respondent's contention, therefore, that Rule 59 applies and 
that Rule 60(b) is not applicable to this action. 
IDINT II 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED 'ID ESTABLISH SUFFICIENT BASIS 
ID SEr ASIDE THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER DENYING HIS MDrION 
FDR RELIEF UNDER RULE 60 (b) , UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Appellant has moved, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(l) & (7), for this Court 
to reverse the judgrnent of the trial Court in refusing to vacate a judgment 
entered after trial. It is well established law that a trial court may be 
reversed only if an abuse of discretion is clearly shown in the record. Warren 
vs. Dixon Ranch Company, 260 P. 2d 741 (Utah, 1953), Salt Lake Hardware Company 
vs. Nelson Land and Water Company, 134 P. 911 (Utah, 1913). Pursuant to Rule 
6l(b)(l), Appellant must show that excusable neglect exists and that it was so 
clearly established that it -was an abuse of discretion for the trial Court to 
refUse to set aside the judgment. 
-5-
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Excusable neglect has been reviewed by this Court in detail before. 
In Warren vs. Dixon, the Court stated: "In order for this Court to overturn 
the discretion of the lower Court in refusing to vacate a valid judgment, 
the requirements of public policy demand more than a mere statement that a 
person did not have his day in court when full opportunity for a fair hearing 
was afforded to him or his legal representative". At page 744. 
A review of the cases cited by Appellant in his brief where this Court 
has reversed the lower court is instructive. 
In Helgesen vs. Inyangumia, 636 P. 2d 1079 (Utah, 1981) an insurance 
adjuster in negotiation with plaintiff's counsel, failed to turn over the 
Surrmons and Complaint to his attorney before entry of default for the reason 
that he was awaiting further information promised by plaintiff's counsel and 
expected to negotiate further on the claim. The default was taken without 
prior notice to the trusting adjuster. 
In Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite Company, 376 P. 2d 951 (Utah, 1962), 
plaintiff served the just resigned president of a financially troubled corpor-
ation, having about 3,000 shareholders, whose affairs were in a caotic state. 
Other than the just resigned president, there was no other in state, responsible 
officer and, before the shareholders were able to hire local counsel, a default 
judgment had been entered. 
In these cases, defendants could be said to have exercised due diligence 
with regard to the suits filed and no substantial delay was caused to plaintiff 
when the motion for relief from the judgment was filed. In Mayhew, events beyond 
control of the shareholders of the corporation caused the default. In Helgesen, 
counsel for plaintiff gave less than the usual courtesies when taking a default 
-6-
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without notice to an agent of defendant who was waiting for further infor-
mation from that attorney. 
Contrast this with the cases cited by Appellant in his brief where the 
lower court's ruling was not disturbed. 
In Airkem Intermountain Inc., vs. Parker, 513 P. 2d 4?5 (Utah, 1973), 
defendant was sued on January 26, 1972 and filed an Answer through counsel on 
February 8, 1972. However, he failed to contact his attorney from February, 
1972 to September 21, 1972, the date of trial. Defendant 1mew that he was dif-
ficult to contact because of his working hours, but in an ai'fidavit, claimed 
he had a terminally ill spouse who was in a nursing home for three months just 
prior to trial. Just before trial, defendant's counsel attempted to withdraw, 
which was denied. Neither defendant nor his counsel appeared for trial._ The 
Court noted: "His failure to contact his counsel under such circumstances from 
February to September 21, 1972, could reasonably be considered as not constitu-
ting due diligence by the trial court ••• Since defendant's conduct was not 
entirely inexcusable, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing 
to relieve defendant of the judgment". At page 431. 
In Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Company, one Arnold Dixon was served with 
process. At the t:Une of service he was ill. He failed to file an Answer. 
Another shareholder, well after default was entered, attempted to file an 
Answer and Counterclaim. This Court noted that, while discretion of the lower 
court should be exercised in defendant's behalf in doubtful cases: "The 
movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control". At page 743. Illness 
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at the time of service of process, under these circumstances, was not "excu-
sable neglect". See also, Peterson vs. Crosier, 81 P. 860 (Utah, 1905) and 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc., at page 431. 
Appellant's case fits the pattern of Airkem Intermountain Inc. and 
Warren. 
(1) Appellant had a full opportunity for a fair hearing. Appellant 
was afforded a trial on October 1, 1981, notice of which was given to his 
former counsel and to him by his counsel in a letter, addressed to him at his 
then current and now current address. 
(2) Appellant's clear neglect of his rights and responsibilities 
was the cause of his failure to appear at trial. Appellant's former counsel 
mailed to Appellant its Withdrawal of Counsel noting the time of trial, on 
December 15, 1980. Also, the letter of former counsel, dated September 25, 
1981, (addressed to the same address, which Appellant acknowledges as having 
received), makes clear that former counsel had mailed him not only the With-
drawal of Counsel notice and had advised him of the October 1, trial setting, 
but, in addition, that they had sent other letters since they first appeared 
on his behalf and that he had never answered their letters or contacted them 
since the initial contact. Appellant was mailed a Notice to Appoint New 
Counsel in this case on September 16, 1982. None of these letters and notices 
prompted Appellant to either appear at trial or hire an attorney to represent 
him. 
Appellant claims in his Affidavit that he requested his wife to go to 
the courtroom on October 1, 1981 to present his case. In that Affidavit he 
gave no reason for not appearing at trial. Mrs. Houghton was not a party to 
-8-
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the action. In a supplemental Affidavit filed by Mr. Houghton on November 
18, 1981, Appellant stated that, "Notice was insufficient to allow him to arrange 
his business and travel to Salt Lake City". It is to be noted that Mr. Houghton, 
as a self-employed contractor, is presumably capable of arranging his work as 
he wishes. More to the point, he still failed to give any specific reasons why 
he was unable to appear for trial. Apparently, Appellant felt it was inconven-
ient for him to appear and he sent his wife to represent him. Appellant's affi-
davits, it is submitted, fall far short of establishing the statutory standard 
required of Appellant to exercise due diligence. 
Indeed, Appellant's position recalls the language of this Court in 
Peterson vs. Crosier: 
A party cannot thus intentionally remain away from a trial 
to which he is a party for the purpose of giving his attention 
to and performing other business duties of a purely private 
character, and, after judgment has been rendered against him, 
have the same set aside and the case reopened on the ground 
of excusable neglect. If courts and judicial proceedings were 
thus conducted only as they might suit the convenience and 
caprice of litigants, but few cases would ever be brought to 
a successful termination. 
The neglect of Appellant is apparent in the record from the inception 
of the relationship between Valley Leas:lng and Mr. Houghton. Respondent did 
not seek out Appellant for lease of equipment until such time as Appellant had 
indicated a desire to enter into an equipment lease. It was only after initial 
contact and investigation that Respondent purchased the equipnent for leasL""lg 
specifically to Mr· Houghton. Respondent maintains no inventory of equipment 
and would not have purchased the equipnent but for Mr. Houghton's desire to 
-9-
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obtain possession of it. Mr. Houghton retained possession of the equipnent 
for more than three months after giving Respondent a rubber check. Appellant 
has never paid any money to Valley Leasing in this transaction. Respondent was 
required to file an action in this matter and was required in normal course 
to wait for more than a year for the matter to come up for trial. 
After causing significant losses and damage to Respondent by the 
issuance of his bad check and the total breach of his lease agreement, and after 
neglecting his rights and his responsibilities with regard to his counsel and 
the Court, Appell~t wants the judgment set aside. 
Appellant has simply not shown that he exercised due diligence of a 
man in his position or was prevented from appearing at trial because of circum-
stances over which he had no control. He failed to contact or pay his attorneys, 
to take any action during the year the case was pending in Court, and failed to 
appear at trial even though it was possible for him to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
As to Point I, nothing in this case indicates that Appellant's 
Answer was stricken and a default judgment entered. Therefore, Appellant's 
rights are limited to Rule 59 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and he has 
failed to show that he is entitled to relief under Rule 59. 
Assuming arguendo that Rule 60(b) applies, Appellant has failed to 
establish that excusable neglect exists in this case. Certainly the record 
reflects much neglect by Appellant, but little, if any, appears to be excusable. 
Critical to Appellant's position on Appeal, is showing in the record that Appel-
-10-
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lant exercised "due diligence". It is submitted, that any such showing on the 
part of Appellant is lacking. 
Absent a showing by Appellant that excusable neglect is clearly 
established in the record, the refusal of the trial judge to set aside the 
judgment was not an abuse of discretion and his Order should not be set aside. 
~'-
DATED this J_ day of June, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Allen Sims 
Attorney for Respondent 
MAILING CERrIFICATE 
The undersigned certifies that two (2) two and correct copies of the 
foregoing Respondent's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Frank T. Mohlman, 
., r~ 
Attorney for Appellant, 275 South Main Street, Tooele, Utah 84074, on the ..:::> 
--
day of June, 1982. 
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-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
